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Ethiopia: An Alternative Approach to National Development
Daniel Kendie

Abstract:
The existing Ethiopian constitution that is based on ethnicity should be discarded and
replaced by another constitution that recognizes territorial nationalism, which
manifested itself in historic Ethiopia as regionalism or provincialism. The historically
established status of the provinces of Arussie, Bale, Gondar, Harar, Shoa, Sidamo,
Tigrai, Wollo, Wollega, and so on, would have to be restored. A federal constitution
which corresponds to Ethiopia’s historical experiences, but modified to suit its present
conditions, and based on such principles as the rule of law, state secularism, a bill of
rights, a system of checks an balances, political and economic pluralism, including the
legalization of political parties that are organized on the basis not of ethnicity, but on
political philosophies and ideologies, should be presented to the Ethiopian people. An
Ethiopian state organized in such a manner would be stable. It would also be in a much
better position to conquer poverty, to solve its problems with Eritrea, its former
province, and to intensify development cooperation with all of its neighbours in order to
help speed up sub- regional economic integration.
Why an alternative approach to national development? What is wrong with the existing
system? Why should the present constitution be discarded? Since Eritrea was an
Ethiopian Province, how did it become independent? These and similar other questions
will have to be addressed first before proposing what measures should be taken to
ameliorate the situation. For this reason, a brief account of the country’s history needs
to be provided.
Language Groups and National Unity
Given its geographic location, physical size, population composition, and resource
endowments, Ethiopia could have played a crucial role in the economic transformation
and integration of the countries of the Horn of Africa. However, its relative
underdevelopment and the tenuous nature of its national unity have kept such a
possibility out of its reach. At the root of its underdevelopment, which is itself the root
cause of civil conflicts, is the lack of an enlightened and informed leadership which
could have taken timely and decisive measures to address the country’s developmental
problems and guide its transition from one stage of development into another. Conflicts
over power and resources are driven principally by economic interests and are sustained
by them. The uneven distribution of resources and of infrastructure, as well as
environmental degradation and widespread poverty, creates propitious ground for
violence. Given state repression and politically motivated sociology, including the
policy of divide and rule, economics is overlaid on ethnicity, and economic problems
pass for ethnic conflicts.
The people of Ethiopia have more in common that unites them than is commonly
understood. They have had centuries of experience of a common history and culture,
which they enjoyed within a shared geographic space. Besides, the concept of kinship
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and ethnicity has little meaning as a guide to the grouping of peoples in the country.
Rather, one has to talk of peoples using a language and culture of Hamitic, Semitic, or
Cushitic origin, or sometimes of a mixture of cultures.1 Almost all scholars now agree
that for at least 3,000 years and probably longer, Semitic, Cushitic, and Hamitic
languages, all of which are related, have been spoken in the highlands of Ethiopia.2
The country’s population of 53 million is diverse in geographic, religious and linguistic
terms. According to the national census, the Oromos and Amharas account for 32.15%
Population of Ethiopia by Ethnic Groups:
Ethnic Group
Afar
Agaw
(Awingi & Kamyr)
Amhara
Ari
Bench
Gedeo
Gumuz
Gurage
Hadiya
Jebelawi
Kaffacho
Kemant
Kembatta
Kembatta
Alaba
Konso
Koyra
Oromo
Sidama
Somale
Tigreans
Wolaita
Gamo
Goffa
Kulo/Dawro
Yemsa
Other Groups
Foreigners
Not Stated
1

Size of Population

% of Eth. Pop.

979,367
555,722

1.84%
1.05%

16,007,933
155,002
173,125
639,905
121,487
2,290,274
927,933
118,530
599,188
172,327
499,825
125,900

30.13%
0.29%
0.33%
1.20%
0.23%
4.31%
1.75%
0.22%
1.13%
0.32%
0.94%
0.24%

153,419
107,595
17,080,318
1,842,314
3,160,540
3,284,568
1,269,216
719,847
241,530
331,483
165,184
1,413,318
105,000
5,827

0.29%
0.20%
32.15%
3.47%
5.95%
6.18%
2.39%
1.36%
0.46%
0.62%
0.31%
2.66%
0.20%
0.01%

Spencer Trimingham (1952). Islam in Ethiopia, (London: New York, Oxford University Press), P.5
Donald L. Donham (1985), Work and Power in Maale, Ethiopia (Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press) p. 31.
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Total (80)

53,132,276

100 %

Source: CSA (1994)
and 30.13% of the population respectively. Others include the Tigreans (6.18%) and the
Somalis (5.95%). The remaining groups represent only 25.59% of the country’s
population. While 60% of Ethiopians are Christian, 40% are Muslim.3 It should also be
noted that there are more speakers of Amharic, probably some 75%, than those who
ethnically would be considered Amharas.
The Ethiopian state grew organically out of history by cultural, political, military,
administrative and economic processes. Indeed, a study of the political history of
Ethiopia also shows that there has been very little antagonism between the various
language groups. In the majority of times, the problem has been between the rulers and
the ruled irrespective of the ethnic origin of the rulers. 4 Donald Levine, a widely
recognized scholar of the Horn of Africa, maintains that Ethiopia with its political,
religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, should be considered a single cultural region
for the following reasons: For the last two millennia at least, the peoples of Ethiopia
have been in more or less constant interaction through trade, warfare, religious activities,
migration, intermarriage, and exchange of special services, and that integration into a
single polyethnic imperial system was brought about through the efforts of the
Axumites, and later the Amharas, so that stability and unity in diversity find ready
expression in Greater Ethiopia. He acknowledges what the Tigrean contribution has
been to Ethiopia’s unity, how the Tigreans maintained continued loyalty to the Ethiopian
state, and how the Oromos who live throughout the country, revitalized the state, and
provided the necessary social cement as well as the leadership, to connect the diverse
peoples of Ethiopia.5 Having examined what trait the three major language groups, i.e.,
the Amharas, Oromos, and Tigreans share in common, Levine concludes that by virtue
of sharing similar cultural traditions and a common national heritage, the Ethiopians
managed to survive the forces of internal disintegration and remain the only part of
Africa not colonized by the Europeans. More recently, he noted that the peoples of
Ethiopia are more similar and historically more connected than the different nationalities
that composed the Soviet Union, that the evidence of their deep affinities is simply
overwhelming, that Ethiopians outside the northern highlands need to have their
traditions respected and their deprivations acknowledged, but the sense in which they
belong to a common cultural area needs to be appreciated.6
The German ethnographer, Eike Haberland, also emphasizes that as a result of
migrations, interactions, conquests, trade, intermarriage, and so on, the diverse peoples
of Ethiopia have created a single geographic and cultural unit7 Markakis too confirms
3

The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Addis Ababa.
.Solomon Terfa (March –April 1997) “Frustration –Aggression or What?” Ethiopia Review
5
.Donald Levine (1974) Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, (Chicago & London:
The University of Chicago Press), PP.92 – 112.
6.
Donald Levine (August 1992) “Greater Ethiopia Reconsidered”, Ethiopia Review.
7
. Eike Haberland (1963) Galla-Sud-Athiopians (Stuttgart:Kohlammer for Forbanins Institute).
4
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that since the traditional Ethiopian conception of ethnic identity centres on religion,
social distance in the south, as in the north, is primarily determined by religious
differences. Where religion is not a factor, ethnic differences pose no great barrier to
contact and even to integration. Markakis further contends that considerable integration
has been achieved between Amharas and the other Ethiopians living in Shoa, Wollega,
and Illubabor Provinces. Intermarriage here, he says, is not uncommon, even for
members of the royal family.8 But he could have also included Wollo, Gondar, Gojjam,
Harar, and the other provinces, where integration has been going on for centuries.
Loyalty for Oromos, for example, like for most Amharas, has been more regional and
territorial, than ethnic. This is so because regional identification has had the first claim
on people’s loyalties. Every Gurage, Oromo, or Amhara who lives for example in
Wollo would say “ine ye wollo liji negne”, I am a citizen of Wollo. Every Oromo or
Amhara who lives in Harar would say the same- I am a citizen of Harar. That is how the
primary identification of Ethiopians has been formed.
Lipsky also affirms that there has been a great deal of intermarriage between Amharas
and Gallas/Oromos. In Shoa province, for instance, he says, by the 1920s, observers
reported great difficulty in telling the difference between Amharas and Gallas, and that
the process of amalgamation has continued since then9. In fact, there is no region or
province that can be said to be pure,10 except perhaps the Ogaden and the Afar region.
If Robert Hess, Levine and others describe Ethiopia as a country that has preserved its
nationhood and independence for more than 2,000 years,11 and as an ingathering of
peoples with deep historical affinities,12 on the other hand, there is, for instance, Herbert
Lewis, who claims that the Ethiopian Empire was formed during the period that the
British and French Empires were, and with many of the same means: through a series of
conquests, some of them quite brutal13 Merara Gudina, too, claims that much of the land
that is inhabited by Oromos was incorporated into Ethiopia only during the reign of the
Emperor Menelik.14 Such misconceptions and distorted historical interpretations that
are devoid of genuine scholarship have been repeated with deadening regularity. Before
correcting the misconceptions, we must review the country’s history, even if briefly.
Brief History
Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries of the world. Its ancient and modern history has
been the history of the survival of a people who maintained their identity through
stubborn conquest and reconquest of their neighbours or invaders, absorbing the better
part of their culture, and producing a culture which could be called their own. Ethiopia
8

John Markakis (1974) Ethiopia: Anatomy of A Traditional Polity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press)
P. 135-136
9
. George Lipsky (1962) Ethiopia, its People, its Society, its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press)
pp.30-35.
10
. See “Ethiopia: the Federal Sham”, The Economist, August 16, 1997.
11
Robert Hess (1970), Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy (London: Cornell University Press),
pp. 30-50.
12.
Levine, Greater Ethiopia, P.26
13.
Herbert Lewis in Crawford Young’s The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?
14
See Tobia (Amharic Weekly) Addis Ababa, number 7, Megabit 1987=March 1995.
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has been described as an “ethnic museum”.15 But, the idea of Ethiopia is also bigger,
larger and deeper than the sum total of its contradictions.
A Semitic language called Geez or Ethiopic, (still in use as the liturgical language of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church), served as the official language of the first Ethiopian state
of Axum, which flourished from 5 B.C. till 8 A.D.16 With the decline of Axum, there
arose a significant upheaval and migration of populations. Some stayed in the north, and
others moved south. Those who stayed in the north developed Tigre and Tigriagna
languages from Geez. Similarly, those who moved south developed Amharic and
Guragegna languages from Geez. Civil disorders and the absence of even minimum
standards of security are certain to have prevented social intercourse remote from one’s
home and thus to have created regionally water-tight compartments17
Even if Geez had held a position in Ethiopia, which is similar to that of Latin in Europe
in the Middle Ages, by the 13th century it was definitely transformed into Tigre and
Tigrigna in the north, and Amharic and Guragegna in the south. Tigre and Tigrigna are
as mutually unintelligible as Spanish and Italian. But if Geez is compared to Latin, then
Tigre, which is spoken in present-day northern and western Eritrea, takes the place of
Spanish, and Tigrigna – the language spoken in central Eritrea and Tigrai, can assume
the role of Italian, and Amharic, the national language of the country, can take the place
of French. At a basic level, the bifurcation of the people into Tigreans and Amharas has
not altered the overlap of values, consciousness of historical relationship, religious
affiliation, and social organization. They stand relatively united in facing the pressure of
other intermingling and surrounding people.18 They take great pride in their history,
deriving political and social unity from their historic role in the creation of such centres
of civilization as Axum, Adulis, Yeha, Lalibela, and Gondar, and that though often
rivals in the past for political supremacy, they have always maintained awareness of
their common religion and descent from common Semitic forebears.19
With the decline of Axum, however, power shifted to the south, and with it began a
southern expansion. The Ethiopian Kingdoms of Lalibella (1137-1270), of Shoa (13001600), and Gondar (1632-1885), became militant exponents of Axum’s culture. Amde
Tsion (1314-1344), Negus Yeshaque (1414-1429), Zere Yacob (1434-1468), and Serse
Dingil (1563-1597), could be described as the leaders who laid down the foundations of
the Medieval Ethiopian state.20 In their days, Ethiopia was well provided with iron, and
its soldiers were armed in much the same fashion as European early medieval soldiers.
The country also impressed travelers by the people’s skill in the arts and architecture and
15

.Conti – Rossini (1928), Storia d’Ethiopia, Milan, Chapter 1.
For the history of Axum, see J. Kobishchankov (1979) Axum (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State
University Press); see also Munro – Hay (1991) Aksum: An African Civilization of Late Antiquity
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
17
. Edward Ullendorff (1955) The Semitic Languages of Ethiopia (London:Taylor”s Press), p.8
18
Lipsky, Ethiopia: its Peoples… P.35.
19
IBID, Lipsky, P.35.
20
See G.W.B. Huntingford Oxford: (1965) The Glorious Victories of Amde Seyon. See also J. Perruchon
(translator), Les Chroniques de Zar ‘a Ya’ eqob et de Ba eda Maryam, (Paris: 1893). For Serse Dingil
see C.F. Bechingham and G.W.B Huntingford Some Records of Ethiopia (London: 1954).
16
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by the piety and learning of its churchmen.21 It was also a vast country. In the north, it
extended as far as Massawa and the Barka lowlands overlooking the Sudan plains. The
southern provinces included the former kingdoms of Ifat, Fatajar, Dawaro, and Bali.
Negus Yeshaque, for instance, who conquered the port of Zeila in 1415, also conquered
the rich and fertile southwestern provinces including Kembata, Welamo, Sidamo and
Kefa.22 In a series of brilliant military campaigns, Serse Dingil, in turn, put an end to
Harar as a military power, and to OttomanTurkish expansion in the Red Sea coast of
Ethiopia, except for the Port of Massawa, where the Ottoman Turkish presence was
heavily fortified.23 Likewise, the foundations of the modern Ethiopian state were laid
down by the Emperors Tewodors II (1855-1868), Yohannes IV (1872-1889), Menelik II
(1889-1913), and Haile Selassie I (1930-1974).
That the Emperor Menelik 24 “conquered” – re-incorporated would be more appropriate,
the southern and eastern provinces of today’s Ethiopia is a fact. However, a selective
interpretation of the country’s history that is provided by such individuals as Herbert
Lewis and Merara Gudina conveniently overlooks another fact, i.e. that these provinces
were part and parcel of Ethiopia before the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, and before the
Muslim plunder and destruction of the country led by Ahmed-ibn-Ibrahim or Gragne
(1527- 1548),25 and before the Oromo migration from the Bale province of southern
Ethiopia, to central, western, eastern and northern Ethiopia.26
Herbert Lewis himself admits that the Oromos are to be found everywhere stretching
from the Tigrai Province of Northern Ethiopia to Kenya and from the Sudan border to
the Somalia border, and recognizes that they occupy much of the best fertile land in the
country.27 But how was the land acquired? Wherever Oromos went, they raided and
burned down settlements. In fact, as early as 1555,the Governor of Bale, Hamelmal,
fought and resisted their expansion. Serse Dingil, who had built the churches of St
George in Jimma and that of St Mary in Damot, in what is now called Wollega, defeated

21

Lewis H. Gann etc. Africa and the World (2000) Lanham. New York. Oxford: University Press of
America) p. 243.
22
.Levine, Greater Ethiopia. Pp.73-76.
23

.Trimigham, Islam in Ethiopia, PP.70 – 79. See also Stephen Longrigg (1945), A Short History of Eritrea
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press), P 86.
24 .
See Harold Marcus (1975) The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1849 – 1913 (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press).
25
Trimingham describes the Muslim plunder of Ethiopia in these words: “The conquest was devastating in
its destruction, irresistible in its ferocity, and appalling in its cruelties,” see Islam in Ethiopia, PP. 76 –
89. For an eye-witness account see Shihab Ad-Din in Futuh-al-Habasha (1559). It is slightly biased in
favour of Muslims. It has been translated to French by Rene Basset as Etudes Sur L’ Histoire
d’Ethiopie (Paris: 1882).
26
. For the origin of the Oromos and their expansion throughout Ethiopia, see BAHREY, History of the
Galla (a) in E.A.W. Budge, A History of Ethiopia, 2 vols. (London:1928) (b) in C.A. Beckingham and
G.W.B. Huntingford, Some Records of Ethiopia, 1593-1646 ( London, 1954), See also Herbert Lewis,
“The Origin of the Galla and Somali, Journal of African History, VII, I (1966) PP27-46. According to
him, the Galla/Oromo migration began in about 1530.
27
.Herbert Lewis, “Ethiopia Beginning Again”, (Sept. – Oct. 1991) African Report, Vol. 36. No. 5,
PP.59-62.
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them in Zewai in 1570.28The uprooting and displacement of non-Oromos during the
course of Oromo migration and expansion in past centuries, which was fiercely resisted,
and which is amply documented, seems to be overlooked. In the process, old Geez or
Amharic names were replaced by Oromo names. For example, “Melza” became Wollo;
“Mekane Selassie” changed to Woreilu; “Damot” became Wollega; and “Inarya”
changed to Illubabor. While liberals condemn some of Menelik’s re-incorporation
policy, some of which was brutal, right-wing nationalists would say that what Menelik
and the other leaders of 19th century Ethiopia did was to recover land that belonged to
Ethiopia in the first place, and may even add that the application of the principle of selfdetermination for Oromos cannot be different from the way other Ethiopians should
exercise it.
By taking advantage of the exhaustion of the country that fought a fifteen-year defensive
war against Ottoman supported Gragne, and driven by population explosion and by the
cycle of the gada system, Oromos plundered Ethiopia. The Amharas, Tigreans, Agews,
and Gurages in turn plundered the Oromos. So what? Getting into a debate as to who
was the villain and who was the victim is a dead end. It would take the discussion
nowhere. It must not be forgotten that war, conquest, enslavement, destruction, pillage,
and massacre, make up all too much of the wretched chronicle of human history.
Besides, which conqueror in history ever cared for the welfare and dignity of the
vanquished? Ethiopian history cannot be an exception. Why should the present
generation of Ethiopians be responsible for what happened four hundred or even one
hundred years ago? There is no such thing as guilt by birth or by association. Bloodshed
and destruction is to no one’s interest. The challenge for Ethiopians is to establish a
system where the people can live in peace and in circumstances of equality of
opportunity, and where they care for one another. There are enough sane and rational
Afars, Amharas, Gurages, Oromos, Somalis, Tigreans, and so on, who can provide the
necessary leadership. Certain regularities in human actions and certain laws in human
behaviour have led to certain truths, which have now become universal: That there is a
difference between what the individual wishes to become and what society permits
him/her to be, and that gifted individuals come to the helm of leadership through the
28

Tekle Tsadik Mekuria (1960) Ye Ethiopia Tarik Ke Atse Lebne Dingil Eske Atse Tewodros, (History
of Ethiopia from Emperor Lebne Dingil to EmperorTewodros) (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education,
1968) p. 98.
29

. W.Connor (1972), “Nation-Building or Nation –Destroying, World Politics 24, 3 pp.319-355.
. Tom Nairn (1977) The Break –up of Britain: Crisis and New-Nationalism, (London:NLB), PP.306-328.
Ethnicity and nationalism can be identified as strong attachments for any group of people who set
themselves apart from other groups with whom they interact in terms of some distinctive criteria such as
language. When taken to the extreme, the norms and values of ones own culture becomes the basis for
judging others. The more so when individuals are born and raised in a culture which is the only one
accessible to them, they lack the exposure to other cultural perspectives. Such ethnocentrisms contribute to
irrational prejudice and encourage hostility towards outsiders. Benedict Anderson (1991) Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London: New York, Verso), argues
that nationalism and nations are inventions either of rulers or intellectuals who cannot justify themselves
without getting their history wrong. Both tendencies, he says are ideologically constructed from
sometimes arbitrary assumptions and unverified facts and obvious falsehoods.
30
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normal channel if society has ways of discovering them. The challenge for all
Ethiopians is therefore to devise such a system, which will permit the discovery of such
individuals from whose integrity, modesty, intelligence, creativity, insight, and vision
the country can benefit.
Responsible leaders recognize that “knowledge” in most cases is an assortment of facts,
assumptions, interpretations, and conclusions. So, they are careful to limit their claims to
certainty. In fact, they make a conscious effort to minimize the temptation to snap
judgment and over statement. As a result, they do not attempt to express opinions on
matters they know little or nothing about. Before they express their views, they take the
trouble to be sure that it is responsibly framed. When they face challenging problems,
they weigh and consider all possible options. If they do something wrong, they refuse to
compound the mistake by pretending that what they did was “wise.” When they hear a
valid argument, they accept it – even if that means rejecting a cherished personal view.
Greatness to such people comes from admitting their limits. They know that to be human
is to be fallible. They also avoid stereotyping and selective perceptions.
The Integrative Dilemma
If the diverse people of Ethiopia have indeed succeeded in creating a single geographic
and cultural unit, how is the present situation to be explained? Given the global reality,
from the ethnic point of view, out of 185 states only 9.1% can be described as being
homogenous 29 So what is wrong if Ethiopia is multi-ethnic? History demonstrates that
“ethnicity” and “nationalism” has always been the preoccupation of the
intelligentsia.30The intelligentsia provides the historical, philosophical, ethnographic and
geographical basis of ethnicity and nationalism. If necessary, the re-interpretation and
invention of history will be carried out in such a way so as to stress and recreate the
putatively “distinctive” and unique cultural heritage of the ethnic group that they want to
mobilize. In the process, despite the available evidence, history will be rewritten to suit
the purpose. To that end, the intelligentsia of minority ethnic elites have fought to fix
nation-state boundaries around themselves, or to obtain self-determination for
themselves, only to deny it to others.31 If the intelligentsia feels alienated, it will not also
hesitate to take power by other means, including ideological trickery for the creation of a
secessionist state. Secession – a challenge to the orthodox interpretation of selfdetermination - has frequently been used by the intelligentsia to exercise its right to selfdetermination by breaking away either to join another state, or more often to establish an
independent state of its own.32The world has yet to see an instance in which ethnic elites
have established a new social order that does not duplicate the injustices of the old that
they have displaced.33 “National independence” means for them very good jobs and the
creation of a national unit whose frontiers are closed to outside talent - a magnificent job
monopoly for them.34 If the truth has to be told, in a country like Ethiopia, it is not the
31

.Daniel Moyniham (1993) Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics (Oxford: New York,
Oxford University Press), PP. 107 – 126.
32
. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1994), Nationalism (Oxford: New York, Oxford Press), p. 273.
33
. Ayenew Ashagre (April 1966) “The Ethnicization of the Ethiopian State”, The Ethiopian Review.
34
.ERNEST Gellner (1964) Thought and Change (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press),
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peasants and workers of Eritrea, Tigrai, Wollo, or Wollega who brought all the social
tension to the country. It is the so-called “educated” elite, whose “education” was
supposed to have cultivated the innate goodness of man, but who have failed to live by
what was expected of them. The great majority of the masses, especially the workers and
peasants, are the last to be affected by ethnicity and nationalism.35 The integrative
dilemma comes not from tribal animosities or masses in revolt, but from conflicts among
and within the various elites. 36 These conflicts are products of competition between
ethnic elites for state power in which state centralism encourages alienated elites to raise
ethnic demands. 37 The Ethiopian student activists of the 1960s and 1970s who have
influenced current trends in the country, may have been motivated by egalitarian
considerations. However, the solution they provided to what was called “the question of
nationalities”, has led to sawing the seeds of divisive sentiments in today’s Ethiopia.
Forty years ago, for instance, Eritreans were not Eritreans, but Hamassien, Akeleguazaie, or Seraie. Thirty years ago, Oromos were not Oromos, but Mecha, Tulema,
Arussie, or Borana. Likewise, ten years ago, Amharas were not Amharas but Gondere,
Gojame, Bulge, Sainte, or simply Wolloye. Similarly, twenty years ago, Tigreans were
not Tigreans, but Tembien, Agame, Enderta, or Shire. By identifying with a sub-culture,
and by using it as a power base, some members of the intelligentsia have therefore
attempted to climb the political ladder because the system blocked their ascendance to
power.
In this regard, despite the historical, demographic, cultural and other factors which the
people of Eritrea share with the rest of Ethiopia, there has been an attempt to re-write
Eritrea’s history and in the process to distort it 38 That what is now called “Eritrea” was
the cradle of Ethiopian civilization, culture and statehood cannot be disputed. No
professional anthropologist or historian has argued otherwise. After its occupation by
Italy for some fifty years, the victorious world powers established a fact-finding mission
and dispatched it to the former Italian colony in order to ascertain the wishes of the
people. Accordingly, the Eritrean people freely expressed themselves to the Four Power
Commission of Investigation (1946-1947), 39and to the U.N. Commission on Eritrea
(1950-1952).40 On both counts, the majority of the Eritrean people expressed their

PP.169-170.
. Eric Hobsbawn (1990) Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Program, Myth, Reality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press) pp,5-13.
36
. Donald Levine (1965) Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture (Chicago:The
University of Chicago Press), p.150
35

37

.See Brass, P. (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (London: Sage Publications),
PP. 8 – 9.
38
. See for example Bereket Habte Selassie (1980) Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New
York: Monthly Review Press). For comments on the distortion of Eritrea’s history by Eritrean political
activists, see Patrick Gilkes (October 1999) “Eritrea Historiography and Mythology: African Affairs,
The Journal of the Royal African Society, 90, No. 361.
39
.See Four Power Commission of Investigation, Report on Eritrea, Chapter IV, 13 (reprinted)
10 March, 1959, PP. 13 - 92.
40
.For the U.N., see Resolution 390 (V), Final Report of the U.N. Commission for Eritrea (GAOR).
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desire to re-unite with Ethiopia. Similarly, during the British supervised elections of
1952, the Unionist Party - a party which did not campaign for federation or
confederation, but for unconditional re-union with Ethiopia - won together with its allies
47 out of 66 seats of the Eritrean Assembly 41 These are the facts. But the conclusions
made by several Eritrean writers in which they describe Ethiopia as a “colonialist” state,
is, to say the least, highly speculative, without serious foundation in the available
evidence. Such writers are politically motivated. They practice what is called “advocacy
scholarship.” They pay little attention to the need for evidence. In fact, they often form
their views first and then seek support for them later.
The great majority of Oromos take great pride in their Ethiopian identity. They have
played and should continue to play distinguished roles in the peace and development of
Ethiopia. Some of the Ethiopian leaders like Iyoas, Tinishu Ras Ali, Leji Eyassu, the
Emperor Haile Selassie, and the various other kings and queens who ruled Ethiopia from
Ankober, Debre Birhan, Gondar or Yeju, had Oromo lineage.42 Despite this fact, some
Oromo political activists recently wrote a letter to the United Nations Secretary General
Kofi Annan, claiming among other things, that out of the 400,000 square miles of the
land mass of Ethiopia, some 375,000 sq. miles belongs to Oromos (see map), that their
land produces 65% of the Ethiopian government revenue, and that they have been
“colonized” by Ethiopia.43 But the fact of the history is just as we discussed it earlier.
The raids, the burning down of settlements, and the uprooting and displacement of the
original inhabitants by Oromo expansion seems to have been totally overlooked.
The Emperor Haile Selassie is to be credited for helping liberate Ethiopia from the yoke
of Italian Fascism, for establishing the educational system of the country, and for
bringing to an end the isolation of Ethiopia by making it a member of the League of
Nations (1923), the United Nations (1945), the Non-Aligned Movement (1961), and for
making Addis Ababa the Headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (1959), and the Organization of African Unity (1963). But in social terms,
Ethiopia experienced no substantial changes during Haile Selassie’s fifty years of
autocratic rule. He did introduce western education and elements of western bureaucratic
structure and military organization. However, the changes that he brought about had
only a limited effect in the rural areas where most Ethiopians lived. In fact, a United
Nations study based on 1965 data showed that in education, Ethiopia’s ratio of primary
school pupils to total population was only 1.68%. Similarly, in health care, the ratio was

41

. Pankhurst E.Sylvia, and Pankhurst, Richard (1953) Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Last Phase of the Reunion
Struggle, 1941-1952 (Essex:Woodford Green) p.281
42
.Lej Eyassu’s father, Mohammed Ali was an Oromo chief from Wollo. Having renounced Islam, he
was baptized and given the name Mikael by the Emperor Yohannes. Subsequently, he became one of
the key provincial governors. He was married to Menelik’s daughter, Shewareged. Their son, Lej
Eyassu succeeded Menelik. Likewise, Haile Selassie’s Oromo lineage can be traced to his great
grandfather, Guddessa. Haile Selassie had also Tigrean lineage through his father, Ras Makonnen. See
also H. Weld Blundell, The Royal Chronicle of Abyssinia, 1769 – 1840 (Cambridge: 1922).
43
.The information was collected from the Internet. See www.oromo.org/org/osg/oromap2.htm.

11
0.34 hospital beds per 1,000 populations. Life expectancies at birth were 34 years in
1960 and 38 years in 1975.44

MAP OF OROMIA
Source: http://www.oromo.org/osg/oromap2.htm
Yet, the little that was done created a new set of challenges, which eventually overthrew
both the Emperor and the old social structure, which he represented. As Bottomore
notes: The actions of the dynastic elites have made attempts to bring about social and
economic changes from above, but their actions are seriously restricted by the interest
which they have as a class in maintaining the existing state of society. In order to carry
out reform, they would have to permit and to encourage, much greater social mobility, to
extend education rapidly, and to make their own elite positions more easily accessible to
individuals and groups from the lower strata of society. It is doubtful if they can do this
or counter the influence of the new elites, which are competing with them for mass
support.45 It is precisely because their elite positions were not made more easily
44
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accessible that a destructive form of primordialism has gained currency in today’s
Ethiopia. To borrow the words of President Kennedy: “Those who make peaceful
revolution impossible, will make violent revolution inevitable.”
Haile Selassie’s government was overthrown in 1974 and replaced by a leftist military
junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. The new regime established a tightly organized
monopolistic party structure and refused to tolerate other social forces which advocated
political pluralism. Old patterns were systematically destroyed, traditional values and
institutions were replaced with a new set of institutions, laws and standards largely
copied from Eastern Europe, but in the main irrelevant to the needs and aspirations of
the Ethiopian masses. The post 1974 Ethiopian state simply copied a number of models
from the USSR, and made it a law, as if it was an obligatory model for building
socialism. Such institutions, which Ethiopia largely copied from the USSR, were
characterized by a single command centre and by the absence of any mediating
institutions between the citizen and the state. In effect, the autocratic and absolutist
monarchist state was overthrown, only to be replaced by another absolutist state.
Tenant/landlord relationships were abolished, only to be replaced by a system in which
the peasants became the tenants of the state. Furthermore, the military regime banned
political parties, independent trade unions, and the free press. Since it called itself
“socialist”, the major means of production, including rural land and urban houses,
became state owned. In such a set-up, whatever the ruling military officers did went to
increase the extractive capacity of the state, and to diminish the productive capacity of
the population. The result was the establishment of a state whose abuse of power had no
parallel or precedence in the country’s history. Widespread arbitrary arrests, torture,
summary executions, mass displacement, long-term detention without trail, and harsh
prison conditions became the order of the day.46
But to its credit, the military government also expanded elementary and secondary
school education at unprecedented rates. The massive literacy programme in which it
took the initiative, involving some seven million adults, or nearly half of the adult
population, was awarded a UNESCO prize. The defeat and eviction of the invading
armed forces of Somalia from Ethiopian territory that they had occupied in 1978, and
that of the EPLF and its eventual confinement to the mountain stronghold of Nacfa
(1978-1982), should also be recognized. Medical care and provision of water supplies to
rural areas had also been dramatically improved. The land reform programme too needs
to be mentioned. There was some degree of urbanization and industrialization. Against
this background, however, we need to note the fact that some 60 of the leading
government officials, including the Emperor Haile Selassie, Prime Ministers Aklilou
Habte Wold, and Endalkatchew Makonnen, as well as General Aman Mikael Andom
were murdered by the regime. Some 40,000 educated Ethiopians were forced into exile.
46
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The death of some 5,000 – 10,000 youths supposed to have been involved in the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), and the disappearance of some 10,000
to 40,000 people into political prisons, should also not be forgotten.47
Since the regime lacked even a semblance of legitimacy, it wanted to solve all social,
economic and political problems with the iron fist, which resulted in ever-mounting
military expenditures. In 1974, Ethiopia’s defense budget was U.S. $51 million. By
1988, it had reached a level of U.S. $724 million – a fourteen-fold increase. Debt
servicing was $24.8 million in 1974. However, by 1988 it had increased to $256 million
– a ten fold increase-making it almost impossible for the country to accumulate capital.
During the same period, agricultural production dropped by 16.3%.48
For seventeen years, Ethiopians endured one of the most appalling and horrendous
dictatorships ever. The overthrow of that dictatorship by a protracted people’s struggle
in May 1991 was hoped to bring the long awaited peace, democracy and reconciliation.49
Indeed, it was also hoped that a genuinely democratic system of government would
make law constitutional and institutional rather than personal. It was hoped that the
future government would be based on the separation of powers, accountability, a bill of
rights, state secularism, political and economic pluralism, and respect for human rights,
and that, individuals and groups would be free to differ, and to organize themselves
around differing ideas to enhance their legitimate individual and collective interests, that
nationalized property including land and urban housing would be returned back to the
original owners, and that political parties would be legalized to contest elections. Many
Ethiopians honestly believed that such a democratic system of government would also
restore Eritrea’s federal status, and extend the same status to the other provinces of
Ethiopia and make the country a genuine federal republic. By means of such a political
and administrative structure, it was also hoped that the country’s unity and territorial
integrity would be maintained and development efforts intensified.
The Unexpected Regime
To the dismay of most Ethiopians, however, an unexpected regime, which is still busy
tearing down the fabric that holds the country together, came to power. The organization
which bases itself on ethnicity, and which calls itself the Tigrai People’s Liberation
Front (TPLF), which came to power in 1991, had its background in Marxism/Leninism
in which the constitution of the Marxist Leninist League of Tigrai (MLLT) even made it
a regulation that members submit written applications to be allowed to express new
ideas.50
The Historical Background
47.
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In 1972-1973, a group of Tigreans had created a clandestine association known as
Mahber politika, or political association, which shortly came to be known as the Tigrai
Liberation Front. Its members were largely trained and armed by the Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF) 51 Shortly thereafter, well-known individuals within the Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF) became actively involved in organizing what was to become
the Tigrai People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The EPLF provided the necessary military
training and the arms. In fact, a well-known long time EPLF operative, Meharie Haile,
otherwise known as Mussie Barake, became a member of the Central Committee of the
TPLF, and its real military commander. Subsequently, other EPLF functionaries
infiltrated the organization, slowly, but surely. 52The involvement of both Eritrean
movements in Tigrai was not by accident. For cultural and political reasons, the two
Eritrean organizations were at loggerheads with one another. The political and military
need for enlisting allies outside of Eritrea seems to have been uppermost. The urgency to
split the Ethiopian army, to diffuse its area of military operations by engaging it in
various regions, and to sap its energy, in so far as the two Eritrean organizations were
battling it, were some of the motives. Whether pressured or inspired by unbridled
opportunism, the TPLF echoed the EPLF position and began to present the Eritrean
conflict as a “colonial question”. The 320-page book titled Kalsi Hzbi Ertra, Kabey
Nabey, that Meles Zenawi wrote supporting Eritrean independence, would be enough to
show the extent of the commitment of the TPLF to the EPLF.53 As if that was not
enough, the TPLF also added that it was similarly fighting against “Ethiopian
colonialism” in Tigrai, and therefore struggling for the establishment of the “Democratic
Republic of Tigrai”.54
Having liquidated the TLF with the assistance of the EPLF, the TPLF had now to
compete with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), whose largely
Tigrigna-speaking leadership pursued a non-ethnic revolutionary programme. In the late
1970s, with the support of the EPLF, the TPLF fought pitched battles against the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRP), and prevailed with its ethnically
exclusive programme in Tigrai.55 It was also after defeating the EPRP, that the TPLF
was now fully involved in cooperating with the EPLF to defeat the ELF and to
marginalize it militarily in Eritrean politics. That done, both organizations now
mobilized their efforts and energies to battling the Ethiopian army. This was
demonstrated in Enda Selassie in Tigrai, on February 19,1987, when the EPLF forces
51
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fully participated in the fight against the Ethiopian army. 56 Likewise, the TPLF fought
in Eritrea in support of the EPLF, most notably in 1982, when many Tigreans perished
in Nakfa. As an acute observer of the scene, Alem Abay, noted:
The price the Tigreans paid for Eritrea remains unappreciated. It would
not be too difficult to imagine the course of the Eritrean revolution had
the ELF not been pushed out of Eritrea. When the EPLF was pinned
down by Mengistu’s army in Nakfa, the Tigrean fighters arrived for its
rescue twice. During the “Red Star Campaign” of 1982, for instance,
Tigreans fought in Nakfa on the Eritrean side, for nine months.
Furthermore, without the supreme sacrifice of the Tigreans, the demand
for Eritrean independence would have been little more than a bargaining
chip for a negotiated settlement. 57
How the TPLF came to Power
Why did the Tigreans pay the supreme sacrifice for Eritrea’s independence?
Some observers argue that judged by its record, the TPLF was commissioned by the
EPLF to thwart the consolidation and emergence of a modern and unified Ethiopian state
on the southern flank of the Red Sea. The ambition of the EPLF leadership, they say, is
to destroy Ethiopia, and to make Eritrea the successor state, and that the TPLF, and
especially its Secretary General, Meles Zenawi, is nothing but a satellite lackey of the
EPLF 58 It is the same TPLF, they say, that has declared war on Ethiopian nationalism,
which refuses to acknowledge the reality of Ethiopia’s historic existence as a multiethnic state, that has repudiated the symbolism of historic Ethiopia, and that has now
taken power in the country. Many Ethiopians seriously believe that its mission is to
destroy the country from within. And how did it come to power anyway?
The USA had been seeking a renewal of its ties with Ethiopia – a country that was once
Washington’s most important client on the African continent, and despite its close
relations with the Soviet Union, still considered the most attractive of all the countries of
the region. Among the reasons cited were the following: Ethiopia’s large population and
economic potential, the historic nature of U.S.-Ethiopian ties, the ability of the Ethiopian
bureaucracy to get the job done, a strategic location bordering the Red Sea, a Christian
heritage that could serve as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalist movements, and
Ethiopia’s role as host to the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 59 To that end, in an
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effort to find a peaceful settlement to the civil war in Ethiopia, former President Jimmy
Carter was involved as a mediator. The then Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs in the Bush administration, Herman Cohen, too visited Addis Ababa in August
1989. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Irvin Hicks; Robert C.
Frasure, a member of the National Security Council; and former Senator Rudy
Boschwitz were also in Addis Ababa in 1991 for the same purpose. In the June 1989
meeting between Herman Cohen and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly
Adamishin, Ethiopia figured prominently.60 Meanwhile, thanks to arrangements made
for him by the USA and Canada, Mengistu Haile Mariam fled to Zimbabwe on May 21,
1991. Following the June 1991 U.S.-brokered London peace talks composed of the
representatives of the Ethiopian Government, the EPLF, the TPLF, and the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF), a conference which was chaired by Herman Cohen, who
advanced the idea of Eritrean independence, units of the TPLF were given the green
light by the USA Government to enter Addis Ababa. According to Newsweek:
Throwing stones and wielding clubs, demonstrators blamed the United
States for installing new rulers in the capital and supporting the
separation of Eritrea, Ethiopia’s Red Sea province. More than 2,000
people stormed the U.S. Embassy, waving placards and chanting antiAmerican slogans. When the crowd charged a car flying a U.S. flag,
Tigrean rebels opened fire, killing a demonstrator and wounding several
others. At the heart of the Ethiopian rage was the feeling that the U.S.
was abetting the break-up of their country. Angry marchers in Addis
Ababa complained of being cut off from their country’s future. The real
bombshell that day came out of London, when Cohen, a 35-year veteran
of the foreign service, had to jettison original plans and reverse decades
of U.S. policy by calling a referendum on independence for Eritrea.
Cohen spoke with Tigrean rebel leader Meles Zenawi (telling him) that
rebel forces should move on the capital as soon as possible. Still, U.S.
involvement in Ethiopia has not exactly been a model of artful
diplomacy.61
Why the U.S. had to reverse its established policy regarding the maintenance of
Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, or in whose interest the country was being broken-up, or
why, as Christopher Clapham put it, “everyone who counts in a deeper sense in Ethiopia
has been left out of all this,”62 is still quite a mystery. In fact, Tesfaye Dinka, the
Ethiopian Prime Minister of the time and delegate to the London talks, who was enraged
history as a state was only one hundred years old, and that the obelisks of Axum have no relevance to
the people of Wollega. His critics firmly believe that by declaring war on Ethiopian nationalism and its
symbols, he is a planted agent operating from within to disintegrate the country.
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by the decision, said: “Residents of Addis Ababa would violently resist any rebel
advance,” and in protest, he pulled out of the talks.63
Serious errors and misjudgments made by the Western Powers, particularly Germany
and the USA, helped to ignite the break-up of Yugoslavia. Similar errors of judgment on
the part of the USA and Britain contributed to the present tragedy in Ethiopia.
Why were not the Ethiopian people allowed to participate in charting their own destiny?
Does the rule of law proclaim that Ethiopians should be governed by a different set of
standards than the rest of the world? Why were not they allowed to exercise their right
to self-determination? Was the “red flag” of the so-called EPLF and TPLF a convenient
mask designed to deceive the public? Were the two organizations being rewarded for
the role they played in destabilizing the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam? Many
Ethiopians are now constantly asking such questions.
Eritrea’s Independence
It was, in this capacity, that the “transitional” government of Ethiopia, exceeding its
mandate, took measures that continue to endanger the peace and security of the
Ethiopian state. Among other things, the following is what the regime wrote to the U.N.
Secretary General:
The future status of Eritrea should be decided in a referendum. Both the
Transitional Government of Ethiopia and the Provisional Government of
Eritrea have registered their commitment to respect the results of the
referendum. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia wishes to bring to
your attention the need to initiate appropriate measures to enable the U.N.
to play its role and to supervise the referendum.64
By definition, a transitional government can only serve a temporary agenda. It means
that it has no mandate to engage itself on questions of a fundamental nature that can
affect the population on a long-term basis. Moreover, the United Nations had already
disposed itself of the Eritrean problem in 1952. Does it have the mandate to supervise
again another referendum? Why is not that done in several other countries and places
like Puerto Rico, which were disposed of by the U.N. in circumstances similar to that of
Eritrea? If the TPLF regime were truly Ethiopian, it would have been guided by
Ethiopia’s national interest. What was most astonishing was that, apart from
independence, the people of Eritrea were not given other choices, including federation,
confederation, or autonomy, for which the EPLF itself had campaigned for years. The
actions taken by the so-called Transitional Government of Ethiopia indicates how much
influence the EPLF has over the TPLF. As the one time editor of The Ethiopian
Commentator, Haile Mariam Abebe pointed out: “Before anything else, the people
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living in the region called “Eritrea” are, Tigreans. The idea of “Tigreans” and
“Eritreans” as separate peoples, was never ours…”65
In 1992, the “transitional government” forcefully annexed seven fertile districts from
Gondar and Wollo and incorporated them to Tigrai. These districts have never been part
of Tigrai Province. They include Humera, Tselemt, Wolkait and Tsegede, which
historically belonged to Gondar. The others are Raya Azebo, Alamata and Ofla, which
were part of Wollo Province. In order to change the demographic composition of the
annexed districts, Tigrean refugee returnees from the Sudan and demobilized TPLF
soldiers were settled in them. The language of instruction in primary schools also
changed from Amharic to Tigrigna. Eventually, the Amharic speaking natives of the
districts were forcefully evicted from their lands. They became either cheap farm
labourers on their own farms, or street beggars in such towns as Gondar, Dessie and
Bahir Dar. Some joined a peasant armed uprising called "Kefagne," that continues to
struggle against the regime in power.66
In early January 1993, the TPLF regime brutally suppressed demonstrations which were
designed to protest the involvement of the U.N. in the Eritrean independence process.
The demonstrators were challenging the mandate of the so-called TPLF and the EPLF to
initiate the referendum. None of them are democratically elected by the people to be
entrusted with such a responsibility. Even if the referendum was to be accepted as an
“expression” of the will of the people, it is still a product of essentially guerrilla
organizations – unelected and self- appointed at that, on whose initiative much
depended. A future democratically elected government of Ethiopia can raise the
Eritrean question on perfect legal grounds.
Bantustanization
As if its stand on Eritrea was not enough, the regime, which, many Ethiopians describe
as “mercenary”, came out with its ethnic agenda. No government in the world has
devolved powers on ethnic basis. Nor has any government explicitly granted its
constituent parts the legal right to secede. In fact, ethnicity-based parties are banned in
many countries of the world. Even the leading democratic countries like the USA,
Britain, France and Sweden, do not carry such provisions in their constitutions. Groups
which entertain such ideas are considered dangers to public peace and security. South
Africa, for instance, has tried to take ethnicity out of politics. But in Ethiopia, ethnicity
is openly accepted and encouraged, to the extent that the regime insists that it be the
basis of all political affiliation.67 And this is happening in a country where there are
millions of Ethiopians who are not even aware to which ethnic group they belong, where
millions of Ethiopians are products of mixed marriages, and where there are millions
who have broken down the barriers of ethnicity and evolved into Pan-Ethiopian patriots
64
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or nationalists. To which state do these millions belong? The only state they know is
Ethiopia. The regime used language as the basis of ethnic affiliation and has re-drawn
the boundaries of administrative regions along language lines. It created eight ethnicbased states, with the promise that new ones may be created when necessary. Here too,
it should be noted that the setting up of internal administrative boundaries is too
important a national question to be decided upon by a government that was only
“transitional”, and without the people’s mandate. In any event, the new constitution
couched in the old Soviet terminology, established the so-called Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, comprised of eight ethnically based regions or states, namely:
Afar, Amhara, Ben-shangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, Somali, Southern Ethiopia
Peoples and Tigray. Language was the major criteria utilized in drawing up the
boundaries. Article 39 of the constitution states:
Every nation, nationality or people in Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted
right to self-determination up to secession; shall have the right to speak,
write and develop its languages…68
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THE TPLF CREATED ETHNIC ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS

Yet, with the exception of the Afar and Somali regions that are relatively homogeneous,
all have significant minority ethnic groups. These include Amhara ( Agew, Kimant,
Felasha, Oromo, Tigrean); Oromia ( Amhara, Gurage, Tigrean, Sidama etc.); Tigrai
(Amhara, Oromo, Kunama, Erob). In the Southern Nations alone, there are over fifty
tribal groups. If the TPLF practices what it preaches, it would have allowed the Kunama
and the Irob of Tigrai Province, as well as the people of Northern and Northwestern
Gondar and Wollo, whose territories have been forcefully annexed to Tigrai, to exercise
their right to self-determination. Likewise, its mentor, the EPLF, could have done the
same to Afars, the Kunama, the Tigre, the Ben Amir, Bilen and the other nationalities in
Eritrea. But more fundamentally, the use of the linguistic criterion, to the virtual
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exclusion of others is, to say the least, a disaster. In drawing the boundaries little
attention was given to such fundamental questions as history, geographic size,
population density, economic and administrative viability, agriculture and resource base,
level of development of the infrastructure, ability to generate tax revenue, and
administrative capacity.69 While a consolidated democracy like France or Belgium can
live with some uncertainty regarding the future boundaries of the state, such uncertainty
can only be fatal for a country like Ethiopia. Until the coming to power of the current
regime, Ethiopia used to be one of the few stable countries in the region. However, once
the regime started to divide the people into ethnic-based enclaves, each purposely pitted
against the other, tensions among ethnic groups began to increase dramatically over the
past several years.70 The ill-conceived policy has generated internal violence because
ethnic majorities in some states have become intolerant towards minority groups in their
jurisdictions, as has been the case in the Southern Peoples’ Administrative Region and in
the Somali region of Ethiopia. Regional-based ethnicity is also a development risk
because it limits the movement of capital and labour required to take advantage of
economic opportunities, creates entitlement that can block development, and leads to
irrational use of energy and other resources71 The farms in Humera and the Awash
Valley for instance used to provide employment opportunities for 100,000 and 150,000
workers respectively. The workers came from all over the country. The ethnic policy of
the present regime discourages labour mobility. It would in fact perpetuate and even
aggravate regional and ethnic inequality. The manner with which the TPLF government
was going about it suggested not so much a genuine desire to address the wishes of the
various ethnic groups, but to sow and fan discord among them,72 which would greatly
please Machiavelli. Indeed, what is going on in Ethiopia today is not multiculturalism,
but a means of promoting divisiveness along cultural lines.
In point of fact, what has been done has led to disputes, often violent ones, among
various groups over territorial boundaries, often showing the insufficiency of using a
single criterion such as language to define these boundaries and, sometimes, indicating
the hegemonic ambitions of the ethnic leaders of some of the groups. Persons judged to
belong to the “wrong” ethnic group are being expelled from their lands, robbed of their
properties, and dismissed from their jobs. The only people who are above such
persecutions are the members of the ruling elite.
The drawing of ethnic boundaries and the associated fanning of intra-ethnic hatred have
created the sad situation in which many Ethiopian citizens find themselves. They are
made to suffer for no other reason than they happen to speak the “wrong” language.
Individual citizens who claimed Amharic as the only language that they spoke suddenly
became suspect, real “threats” to democracy and justice. Many others who claimed
mixed ethnic parentage found themselves in the impossible position of having to disown
one half of their heritage in order to survive TPLF’s ethnic cleansing. As a result, entire
68
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communities, long settled, and in many ways indistinguishable from the local
community, have been wiped out.
According to Human Rights Watch, the causes of the ethnic disputes are to be found in
the new ideology of self-determination, which has encouraged an upsurge in ethnic
nationalism [expressed] in local disputes over land, water, and grazing rights. The
displacement of 60,000 Amharic-speaking Muslims from the Diba Tena and Mandura
Guanga woredas of Gojjam province following an attack by the Beni Shangul ethnic
group is a case in point.73 The 1995 Conflicts between Gujis and Sidamas ended up with
the intervention of federal forces. In the 1995 and 1999 Oromo- Somali conflicts,
numerous people were killed. In 2001, the so-called Oromo-Amhara conflict in Eastern
Wollega, in reality instigated by the regime, resulted in the death of many lives and in
the displacement of 12,000 Amharic speaking Ethiopians. Another case in point is the
attack on non-Oromos in Arussie in which 60 people were killed, 60 were wounded,
6205 heads of cattle were looted, 64 houses were destroyed, and crops on 247 hectares
of land were set on fire, and 3,000 persons of Gurage ethnic background were displaced
and hundreds of them killed.74 In Arba Gugu region, 320,000 Amharas were displaced
and hundreds of them killed. Villagers were burned alive. Some 150 Christians were
killed in Arba Gugu and a further 46 were murdered in Harar.75

A conflict between the Geri and Jaarso clans displaced 125, 000 people near Jijiga,
while 45,000 were affected by the fighting between the Yabere and Issaq. In the far
south of the country, there has been fighting between the Borana Oromo and the
Marehan Somali. Other local ethnic groups, such as the Guji, have also been drawn in.
The fighting caused tens of thousands of refugees to flee to nearby Kenya. In the west,
ethnic Annuak and Nuer have clashed and Amhara settlers have been attacked in
Wollega. An unknown number of highlanders were also killed in a Nuer attack on a
market place.76
For example, in the Oromiya State in 1999, the regional government required that all
primary schools adopt Oromiffa as the language of instruction. This drew protests from
groups that reside there, but whose mother tongue is not Oromiffa and who believed that
their children would be at a disadvantage. Those who protested, including teachers and
government workers, have had their employment terminated.
Similarly, in May 1999, local administrators in the Southern Nations and Nationalities
informed elementary and high school teachers that new textbooks would be used in the
North Omo zone, which merged four closely related languages spoken in the zone:
Welayita, Gamo, Goffa, and Dawro. Neither local communities nor teachers had been
72
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consulted before the decision was made to introduce the new textbooks. Subsequently,
police arrested those teachers who objected to the new language. The arrests led to
widespread demonstrations and rioting in the town of Sodo, during which police killed
ten people, injured hundreds, and arrested and detained as many as 1,000 others. Most
of those arrested were released, but some 20 elders, teachers, and civil servants were
charged with subversion and remained in prison at year’s end because they could not
make bail of between $6,000 and $12,500 (50,000 and 100,000 birr). As a result of this
conflict, Welayita was used as the language of instruction in schools during the year, and
Welayita became its own zone in November.
There were also reports of clashes between the Oromo Borana community and ethnic
Somali Garre pastoralists in the southeast, which reportedly resulted in the death of
some 40 persons and the theft of hundreds of livestock. There were reports of a clash
over grazing and watering rights between the two communities, which reportedly
resulted in the killing of at least 150 people and injuries to many others.
Let alone political parties, even civic organizations cannot be allowed to function unless
they are organized on an ethnic basis. It has become illegal for Ethiopians to register as
Ethiopians and to vote. Individuals who identify with Ethiopia, and who insist that they
can only vote as Ethiopians since they do not belong to any ethnic group, cannot vote.
The truth is, Pan-Ethiopian nationalism and ethnic nationalism cannot co-exist in the
same political space for a long time. The latter does not foster a sense of loyalty to the
larger political community.77 As an acute observer of the scene notes: Ethnicization has
literally blurred the distinction between Ethiopian and Tigrean interests. If you happen
to be an Amhara, no matter how much you cherish justice and democracy, you cannot
represent Tigreans. To assume that all members of an ethnic group, be they peasants,
workers or capitalists, think alike is not rational.78
As a result of the politicization of ethnicity and the destructive policy of bantustanization
that the TPLF has introduced in Ethiopian politics, ethnicity is fostering parochial
relationships. It is interfering with the development of rational and efficient forms of
political and economic administration. Ethnicity is also impeding the optimum
harnessing of human and non-human resources, and has become a serious barrier to
factor mobility.79
The creation of ethnic boundaries for the Afars, Somalis, Oromos, Tigreans, Amharas,
and so on, has ominous implications for the peace and development of not only Ethiopia,
but also of Eritrea, the Sudan, Dijibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and beyond, where common
ethnic groups straddle across common borders. To advance the type of policy on
ethnicity, as the TPLF has done, is to be totally irresponsible. Ethiopians cannot make
economic and social progress in the absence of basic security. Security in turn is
threatened by a policy promoted by a regime that gambles in calculated chaos, and that
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is not accountable to logic, fair play, or sense of decency. Whatever happens to Ethiopia
is not going to take place in a sealed territorial container. It will take others down with
it.
The explanation provided by the regime’s critics is that the TPLF’s obsession with the
politics of ethnicity and its determination to alter the structure of the state is designed in
such a way that nothing remains of what they perceive as the domination of the Amhara
over the rest. Every policy or lack of policy is measured in terms of its impact on the
perceived level of Amhara representation in state bodies, institutions of learning and
cultural fora.80 But it would be more accurate to say that the ethnic policy of the regime
has been created to keep the TPLF in power. The Machiavellian trick of divide and rule
was not born yesterday. It might have also been designed so that if the scheme failed,
the TPLF would secede from Ethiopia and establish an independent Tigrai state. It
might also have been conceived to safeguard Eritrea’s independence by weakening
Ethiopian nationalism. Nevertheless, and to that end, the differences between the various
ethnic groups are highlighted, while values, experiences, principles and goals that they
share in common are played down. Instead of capitalizing on what the people of
Ethiopia have in common and building on that, as most scholars who have studied the
country have recommended, the TPLF regime has found it convenient to emphasize their
differences, to sponsor the independence of Eritrea, and to contain the country’s
diversity through ethnic confederations, rather than through the integration of all people
into a united Ethiopia.
Dr. Beyene Petros, Chairman of the Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and
Democracy in Ethiopia, characterized the system of rule of the present regime as
vindictive, and cited examples which included the disbanding of the armed forces and
police of the country, the mass lay-offs of skilled workers on the basis of their ethnic and
political affiliations, the discriminatory land redistribution in the rural areas, and the
harassment and detention of the members and leaders of opposition groups and trade
unions.81
The TPLF is also labeled as an organization dominated by Eritreans, and working in the
interest of Eritrea. It is strongly alleged by many Ethiopians that in the 1990s, the EPLF
set up a clandestine parallel government in Ethiopia whose sole purpose was looting. It
was heavily involved in contrabands, money laundering, extortion, tax collection,
kidnapping and other illegal activities. In fact, it is widely claimed that the idea of
internal “tribal” restructuring of Ethiopia came from the EPLF leaders. Although Eritrea
is a microcosm of Ethiopia because all the ethnic groups that inhabit Eritrea are
extensions of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia, the EPLF leadership has gone on record to
declare that the Ethiopian system is not suitable for Eritrea. As The Economist put it:
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The rulers of Eritrea have no intention of permitting political parties that are based on
ethnicity to function in Eritrea.82
The EPLF leadership which is facing serious opposition because of its dictatorial policy,
but which claimed to have been fighting for Eritrean independence because Haile
Selassie’s government had banned political parties, and suppressed independent
newspapers, has not done any better. There are no political parties in today’s Eritrea
except the ruling party. In fact, the EPLF has gone on record and declared:
Political parties in Eritrea will not be allowed to have any ethnic, regional or
religious basis. Basing politics on ethnic, clan, and nationality lines definitely
has its negative implications. It will lead to more friction and it might lead to
some kind of disunity. It would be difficult to govern a country that is
organized along ethnic and nationality lines.83
Unless guided by sinister motives, why then recommend it to Ethiopia? It is
the same EPLF leadership which was given the green light at the London
Conference in 1991 to take over Eritrea. It is also the same EPLF from whom
the 15-Member European Union is forced to withdraw all of its ambassadors in
Asmara. While the act could be considered commendable, why limit it to the
EPLF? Why not extend it to the TPLF? One without the other is only half
necessary. Besides, what is the difference between pepsi cola and coca cola?
Education
While it has been asserted that any thought can be expressed in any language, it is well
to recognize that the majority of the languages in the world probably do not possess
vocabularies adequate for higher and especially technical education. For example, in the
early 1960s, the West African state of Guinea, had tried to do what the present regime in
Ethiopia is doing today. Guinea conceived the use of six local languages, including
Malinke and Sossou. However, at the end of the day, it could only appeal to French as a
unifying factor and abandoned the whole scheme.
It can hardly be denied that a major proportion of positions open to educated persons in
countries like Ethiopia require precisely that sort of information transmitted by complex
technical vocabularies. The TPLF authorities that have proclaimed that education
should be provided in the various languages of the country should have taken account of
this fact. Despite suggestions that a child is more comfortable if first introduced to
school in the native language, recognition must be given to the difficulties implied in the
assumption that each child be educated fully in the mother tongue. Creating different
educational institutions for each language group, and providing educational materials in
all the vernaculars, is too expensive and inefficient in the light of the demands made on
the individual in the adult world. On top of that, many Ethiopian languages like for
instance the languages spoken in Abobo and Godere districts of Gambella, lack-writing
systems. Many are not readily useable for typewriters, typesetting machines or the
computer. They lack adequate technical vocabulary for teaching such subjects as
physics and chemistry. Responsible leadership cannot side step these problems. Can
Ethiopia, one of the least developed countries of the world, provide education from
elementary to the university level in so many languages? Even the U.S., the richest
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country in the world that has had a democratic system for more than 200 years, and
where there are some 327 different languages, has not attempted to provide public
education in any language other than in English.
Susan Hoben of Boston University, who spent some time in Ethiopia studying the
educational system, says: During the literacy campaign of the 1970s, the military
regime designated fifteen languages for use, encompassing the mother tongues of 90%
of the population. While the military regime used a non-formal vehicle not meant to be
a permanent part of the educational system, the present regime is promoting their use in
the formal, permanent school system. The Dergue used the Ethiopic script exclusively
for all languages. Now the Latin alphabet is being used for non-Semitic ones. The
military regime had brought down the rate of illiteracy in the country from 94% in 1974
to 63% in 1984. But since the present regime came to power, the literacy campaign has
been brought to a halt. 84
Hoben further points out that in a large town like Jimma, there were streams for
Amharic-medium and Oromo-medium instructions. On the other hand, in Natri, a
hamlet on the road to Jimma, the school had received Oromo materials, though the local
populace was Gurage, Amhara, Hadiya and Janjero. At this school, enrollment had
plummeted, going form 357 students in 1991 to 281 in 1992 and to 133 at the start of
1993. In other schools, students showed us their brand new Latin script books with
some consternation. “We have been studying in Amharic up to now, and all of a sudden,
they expect us to use these,”85 they complained.
Many Ethiopians were also upset that instead of schools teaching in their language or in
Amharic, which would have been most useful, their children were suddenly being asked
to learn in a regional language that was not theirs and that they might not even speak.
Their only recourse in the short run was to vote with their feet. At the same time,
teachers who came from other parts of the country, and who could not speak the local
language adequately, were being dismissed. In fact, in September 1995, the regime’s
party paper, Abiotawi Democracy, reported that 300,000 students had not been
registered in schools throughout what is called Oromia, because 6,000 of their teachers
did not speak or understand the Oromo language.86 The Ado Shakiso School in Borana
had 340 students. Of these, only 30 are ethnic Oromos. In spite of this, the Oromo
language has been imposed as a language of instruction on 98% of the Amharicspeaking students. Mesfin Bedada, the director of the school, himself an Oromo,
confessed that the students are not learning because they are unable to understand
instructions in the new medium, and so they have left school.87As if that was not
enough, the regime does not allow newspapers and other publications originating from
Addis Ababa to be distributed in the regions.88 According to Marina Ottaway, the
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restructuring of Ethiopia along ethnic lines was an obstacle to democratization and
human rights in other ways as well. The independent press, for example, found it
increasingly difficult to distribute publications outside the capital city. The reason, the
government explained, was that each nationality had the right to its own language, which
would be violated by the distribution of Amharic-language publications in regions where
the mother language was different. Language rights were twisted into a repressive
instrument to limit freedom of speech and information.89
In spite of trumpet blast, and contrary to what is being claimed, 72% of school-age
children do not have access to formal education in Ethiopia, and just 15% of eligible
students attend secondary schools.90
The dismissal of 42 university professors from their faculty positions, for no other
reason than they happen to belong to different ethnic groups than those in power, the
prevention of the teaching of Amharic in many parts of the country, including in the
Amharic-speaking regions of Gondar and Wollo which were forcefully annexed to
Tigrai, the drop in the number of students attending schools in Ethiopia in excess of one
million since the TPLF came to power, constitutes the track record of the regime. In
contrast, the regime has built in Tigrai an impressive number of schools and colleges,
including the introduction of computers at all school levels.
But as far as literacy goes, where alphabetization ends, proper schooling begins. If the
relevant literature that can sustain interest in education is not provided, people generally
go back to sleep again. Reading material on agriculture, public health, marketing,
history, geography, and the like, which in some measure can bring betterment of their
material conditions is crucial. The recommendations of the 1972 Education Sector
Review are still valid. That the educational system be Ethiopianized to help in blending
indigenous cultures into the rich national culture, that national consciousness be
strengthened by cultivating values that are appreciative of religious and cultural
diversity, and that the teaching of Amharic as a medium of instruction at the various
levels be carried out, without suppressing vernaculars for initial exposure to education,
and as an important task that is fundamental to national integration.91
Human Rights
Ephraim Haile expresses the feelings of many Ethiopians when he says: The lack of
concern for the common good; the violation of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity; the
sacrifice of the national interest; the wide-spread violations of human rights, including
extensive torture, disappearances and assassinations; the trimming of the civil service by
one fourth, in which the most experienced and qualified civil servants were fired for
political and ethnic reasons; the repeatedly rigged and fraudulent elections; the
imprisonment of human rights activists, leaders of political parties, educators, newspaper
editors and reporters; the banning of the trade unions, teachers associations, and student
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organizations; the massacre of religious worshippers and more, constitutes the track
record of the most sinister traitors in all of Ethiopian history.92
In this regard, the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists
reported:
…Opposition to basic government policies is not permitted. Opponents
who have been in exile are categorized as war-mongers and any
representative who dares to return to Ethiopia does so at his jeopardy. The
facts do suggest that the government’s commitment to human rights and
democratic values is more rhetorical than real. The rhetoric is useful to
tranquilize donor governments, with respect to the continuing signs of
abuse of power, but the substance of the declared human rights is available
only to those who support the government’s policies.93
Similarly, the Solidarity Committee for American Political Prisoners, among other
things, reported: “In Ethiopia killings by the official security men and the government
are on the rise, and that the number of prisoners is increasing.” Some sources claim that
there are some 24,000 political prisoners in the state called Oromia and another 40,000
in Tigrai.94 In fact, from 1992 - 2,000 over 10,000 government opponents were detained
without charge. Today the figure is said to have doubled. Likewise, the constant
harassment of independent-minded journalists, extra-judicial killings, political
imprisonment, involuntary disappearances, torture and detention without charge, ran
rampant as documented by Amnesty International. By using the so-called “Structural
Adjustment” Programme as a convenient cover for ethnic cleansing, the regime has also
systematically dismissed non-Tigrean Ethiopians from their jobs. These include, 10,000
school teachers, 10,061 employees of the Ethiopian Building Construction Authority,
3,400 employees of the Rental Housing Authority, 56,000 civil servants, 300,000
members of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, and so on.95 On March 21, 1997, some 200university students who were protesting against government land policy were also
arrested. In violation of the provisions of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
many of the students were tortured.
Similarly, the police attack of April 2001 on Addis Ababa University’s largest campus
left 41 students and other protesters dead and 250 injured. About 2,500 were also
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arrested. Ethnic politics has polarized teaching at the university to an extent that it has
lost its original mission of charting the country’s development strategy.96
The Economy
The TPLF Leaders had claimed that they took power in order to eradicate poverty from
the face of Ethiopia. But ten years after their coming to power, Ethiopians remain
amongst the world’s poor, with more than half of the population below internationally
recognized poverty levels, and dependent on foreign aid every year to combat famine.
The only ones from whom poverty has been eradicated are the influential members of
the leadership, their families and their friends. The average Ethiopian is poorer today,
than he was thirty years ago.
The government owns the land. Almost 40% of farm households have less than 0.5
hectares of land, and more than 60% have less than 1 hectare from which to support a
family of six or eight people. They now also pay more for fertilizers and other inputs,
while receiving lower prices for their crops.97 If farming is not transformed, there cannot
be a genuine economic development. If agricultural production increases, the population
can be fed adequately. The surplus can be transferred to other sectors. The farmer can
still be better off than he was. Prosperity will also enable him to provide a growing
market for manufactured goods. In this respect, the excess labour force in the
overcrowded highlands could be settled in the south, west and east of the country where
the land: man ratio is favourable. Holdings could also be enlarged and private ownership
encouraged. Land distribution is not simply a matter of egalite judiciaire, but of rescuing
the peasant from the domination of the state. It is the central pillar of the structure of
social privilege. However, given the existing system of ethnic enclaves, neither the
enlargement of the farms nor the resettlement of farmers elsewhere is feasible. The
regime is in power to provide land to its supporters and to take away land from those
who oppose its ethnic policy.
The constitution of 1994 prohibits political organizations from engaging in profitmaking activities. Yet, many of the influential members of the TPLF are engaged in
monetary scandals and fraudulent practices. They have established business enterprises
which include manufacturing industries, banks and insurance, and whose assets are
estimated between 1 billion and 2 billion birr. Other sources claim that the TPLF has
created a business empire worth 3.3 billion birr. For example, out of government
controlled 44 companies that run 3.5 billion birr, the TPLF owns 32 of them. Most of
these companies were state owned, but they were sold by the Privatization Agency to the
TPLF below their market price.98 Some 200 state-owned enterprises have also been sold
at a cost of $357 million, no doubt, again, below the market price, the buyer and seller in
all this being the TPLF. Another 110 state-owned enterprises are to be sold soon.99
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Since there is no accountability, in the midst of mass poverty, instant millionaires have
emerged. Mismanagement, inefficiency, greed, non-payment of taxes, resale of products
in the domestic market which were intended for export, and more, have all become the
order of the day. The authorities have never presented reports of their accounts. They
have never been audited. In fact, TPLF businesses and government businesses have
never been separated, just as in Eritrea. It is claimed that TPLF business firms have
preferential treatment over private-sector companies with respect to government
contracts, custom clearances, government controlled credit facilities, and export and
import licenses.100 There is also the official policy of ethnic bias which prompts the
leaders to allocate disproportional amounts of public resources to the favoured region –
Tigrai.101 Billions of dollars raised from the international community through loans and
aid grants for Ethiopia have been diverted for the exclusive development of Tigrai.
These include highways, airports, factories, telecommunication networks, dams,
electrification of towns, hospitals, and so on. But the question is: What about the other
regions of the country?
Ethiopia has received over $7 billion in grants and loans in the last ten years. Yet, the
cumulative investment capital of the 200 approved projects (1993-1999) was U.S.$1.1
billion. However, only 21 projects with an investment capital of U.S.$400 are currently
in operation.102 So what happened to the rest of the funds? The country’s average annual
population increase has reached 3%. The implication of this is that in order to meet
domestic demand, food production has to increase by at least 6.5%. Inflation stood at an
average annual rate of 15%, pushing basic food staffs beyond the reach of the poor.
Because of the very small tax base and the widespread poverty, most of the newly
created ethnic regions cannot raise their own revenue. As a result, they have started
setting up roadblocks to collect excise duties. The deficit which grew from 7.1% of
GDP in 1993 to 10.2% in 1994, increased to 16.9% in 1995, and has continued since
then. The current $642 million deficit is expected to be covered through external
funding. As of 1992, the birr has also been devalued by 147.8%, making the country’s
99

.Pan African New Agency, May 22, 2001.
.IBID, Aid & Reform, p.221.See also “Ethiopia: Corruption Campaign May Backfire”, The Indian
Ocean Newsletter No.955, 23/06/01. An agency has been established to check corruption in the
government. In a system that has no checks and balances, where the opposition and the private press
are persecuted, corruption is to be expected. However, many Ethiopians have a cynical view about it.
They say that the Prime Minister himself has no moral authority to talk against corruption. They refer to
his family businesses and overseas investments. His wife, Azeb, and his brother Nikodimos Zenawi
have become immensely rich. Benyam Mesfin, son of the foreign minister has also become very rich,
thanks to his father’s position. More particularly, they claim that the attempt to counter corruption was
raised now by Meles as a means of destroying his political enemies. See also Wolde Asfaw, “Can Meles
Fight Corruption?” Ethiopian Commentator, July 17, 2001. According to the author, contrary to the
interview Meles gave to Abiotawi Democracy, claiming that he does not possess anything except books
and the suits he wears, he is a joint signatory with Berhane and Seyume, Tewolde Agame and Seyume,
and others of the multi-million dollar deposited in the bank account in some of the countries in Western
Europe and America. Money donated by the international community to the people of Tigrai in the last
twenty-five years is deposited under private accounts in London, New York, Washington, Rome, etc.
The annual budget of the Relief Society of Tigrai was well over $100 million in the 1980s. Today it is
deposited under the joint account of the above named officials.

100

101

.IBID, p.195.

31
exports correspondingly cheap. The challenge is to raise the investment rate from 18%
to at least 25% of the GDP.103 But without carrying out the necessary reforms regarding
public administration, land use, taxation, banking, infrastructure, accumulation, and so
on, it will be an impossible task. Confiscation, inflation, forced saving, government
bonds, foreign aid, foreign investment, and the creation of export of industrial and
agricultural products are all means of saving. The curtailment of luxury spending by the
privileged ruling elite can also help in the accumulation of capital. At some point, the
savings made will result in more consumption later. But at the beginning, there is no
other way except tightening ones belt. When savings is expanded, productivity can also
increase. When the surplus is re-invested, further expansion is made possible. All this
requires exceptional leadership that has insight and vision, as well as considerable
education and administrative skills. Developing a democratic system that is genuinely
pluralistic, discouraging ethnic politics that is by definition divisive, investing in people,
effective regulation in key sectors of the economy, accountably in public-sector
management, diversification of the economy, promoting private-sector activity and
improving economic management could galvanize economic performance. But the
TPLF is ill-equipped and ill-prepared to do all this. There is nothing in its background
that has prepared it for this type of responsibility.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are providing assistance.
But it is contingent upon austere structural adjustment programmes that include
wholesale privatization, removal of trade barriers, diminished protection for national
industries, reduced corporate taxes, elimination of state subsidies on food, fuel,
education, health and transport, devaluation of currency, and the scaling back of bloated
bureaucracies.104
No doubt, the World Bank and the IMF promote a market-oriented approach to
economic management that rests on the assumption that economic “rationality” is
constant across all societies, regardless of the level of development of any country. It is
also argued that controlling budget deficits and money supplies, and liberalizing the
foreign exchange regime, which, in turn, would ensure that the market was given
freedom to allocate resources within the economy, would rectify the distortions created
by undue and inefficient state intervention in economic management.105 However, this
is contrary to the historical experience of the now industrialized countries.
Some of the World Bank/IMF prescriptions include the following: shrinkage of
government bureaucracies, deregulation of the economy, removal of government
involvement from economic activities, cut-backs in government expenditures, especially
in social spending and subsidies, introducing user fees in education and health care,
increasing food prices, cutbacks in or containment of wages, privatization of stateowned enterprises, devaluation of the currency, elimination of or reduction in protection
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for the domestic market, fewer restrictions on the operations of foreign investors, and so
on.106
As a result, state enterprises are passing into private hands, protectionist barriers on
imports are being eliminated, restrictions on foreign investment are lifted, and exportfirst policies are implemented with quasi-religious zeal. Since the government is forced
to reorient the economy towards exports in order to earn the foreign exchange required
for servicing the national debt, Ethiopia has become correspondingly more dependent on
the global economy. In the process, the power of the government to provide necessities
to the population is being reduced. 107
There is also the problem of privatization. The debate on privatization has been
stimulated by the budget maximization thesis because of the alleged ‘inefficiency’ of
public enterprises, which need constant state subsidy. However, it is a reflection of the
shift in values among governments in Western Europe. It has now been extended to
Africa and elsewhere as part of the general spread of ideas and policy conditions
attached to assistance. But if one studies the economic history of some of the
technologically advanced countries, one can see that governments set in motion all the
major industrial projects of the first break-through, and that national development
requires not just a state, but a strong state. In fact, the less developed, the greater the
need for strong state intervention. The powerful role played by states in the economic
transformation of the countries of Southeast Asia can be mentioned to illustrate the
point.
The assumption that public enterprises are “inefficient” is also dubious. In many ways,
one cannot ignore the interest of foreign capital in preaching this self-serving ritual,
which is likely to increase damaging inequalities. This thesis advances the interests of
central and policy-level officials at the expense of jobs, worsens the conditions of rank
and file state employees, and reduces the services the state should provide to the masses.
To claim that public enterprises are “inefficient” when compared to private enterprises is
not supported by empirical evidence. When an industry is privatized, the managers and
the workers are the same as those who managed the old public firm the day before.
Thus, any change that may occur is not because of the structure of ownership, or the
character and abilities of management, but of constraints in which the firm operates.
Moreover, public enterprises and services have public duties and are not meant as
merely profit-making instruments. It would be inappropriate to judge the performance of
an enterprise by the simple test of the market because society’s needs are too complex to
be reduced to that criterion. Competition between the private and the state sector could
determine efficiency. Nevertheless, instead of state assets being sold to investors, it
would have been much better if shares could be given to citizens.108
105

.IBID, p.19.
.IBID, p.29.
107
. IBID, p.29. There are those who argue that market reforms proposed by the World Bank are designed
to prevent the economic transformation of the less developed countries. See for example Samir Amin
(1993) “Don’t Adjust – DeLink!” Towards Freedom, (April/May).
108.
Kendie “Africa’s Major Development”, p. 30.
106

33

However, many countries like Ethiopia have been subjected to structural adjustment
programmes. Governments are being forced to cut spending on social services in order
to save money, which can then be used to repay external debts. Faced with the threat of
a cut-off of external funds needed to service the mounting debts, countries like Ethiopia
have no choice but to implement the painful measures. But at the end of the day, these
countries like Ethiopia have not been transformed. The prescriptions have brought
neither growth nor development. Ethiopia still remains mired in poverty, social
dislocation, unemployment, malnutrition, homelessness, diseases, and environmental
degradation. One may even argue that in theory reducing the size of the government
would open up opportunities for alternative employment opportunities. But there is no
guarantee that a robust private sector will automatically be created to fill the gaps. In the
meantime the people suffer.
Will it Work?
While the architects of the system that prevails in today’s Ethiopia see it as a creative
and innovative solution to the country’s developmental problems, others maintain that it
is reactionary and anachronistic. They argue that it is a system whose days are
numbered. They say that since it refuses to bend in the face of changed reality, it cannot
hope to survive very long. And actions based on it, cannot hope to be successful even in
the long run. The TPLF, they say, has survived so far not on account of its legitimacy,
but because of the weakness of the opposition. Let alone Ethiopia, it cannot even
administer the Province of Tigrai. Its critics are in favour of dismantling it, and replacing
it with a unifying Pan-Ethiopian nationalism that transcends ethnicity. The more so,
Ethiopians have no prior experience of government by ethnicity. Since political
legitimacy must be based on a broad constituency, a single ethnic group cannot govern
in a multi-ethnic country. Ethnicity may be a viable organizing force for an ethnic
guerrilla movement like the TPLF, but hardly for a political party that hopes to govern a
muti-ethnic state. If history were a guide, successful governments concentrate on
national issues which cross ethnic, religious, and provincial boundaries and aggregate
support based on common concerns.109
Nevertheless, can meaningful devolution be delivered in time to offset the potential
anarchy embedded in an ethnic-based federal system with a weak centre? Many
observers say that it probably cannot.110 Some have already concluded that what the
regime is engaged in is a frightening experiment111Others argue that no one can be sure
whether the experiment with ethnicity will work. Meles Zenawi himself has said that he
does not know if it will work.112 Whatever it achieves in the long run, ethnicity is
making economic, social and political life difficult now. It is testing an administrative
109

.IBID. Joireman (1997) “Opposition Politics” pp.406-407.
. OP.CIT, John Cohen, “Ethnic Federalism”, p.176.
111
. See the report of Donatella Lorch, “Ethiopia Holding Elections in Federal Systems”, The New York
Times, May 1995.
112
.See The Economist, August 16, 1997.
113
. From the radio broadcast of Wendy Belcher, Pacific Network News, December 9, 1997.
114
. Michael Bratton (Spring 1997) “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions, ”Political Science
Quarterly (New York) 112,1,pp.67-93.
110

34
structure already weakened by years of war and an economy battered by periodic
drought. While bitterly resenting Western support to the regime, opposition groups in
general dismiss the whole notion of devolution and democracy as prescribed by the
regime as a sham. All these tendencies point to a dangerous trend, which is pushing the
1
Ethiopian people on the same fatal political course witnessed in the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Wendy Belcher of the Pacific Network News, who was in Ethiopia, has the following to
say: “After years of ethnic federalism, Ethiopia’s experiment is in real jeopardy. Rather
than helping Ethiopia’s smaller groups to feel more secure, it threatens to balkanize the
country113 It has not been easy setting up even permanently based administrative
structures in territories whose inhabitants are largely nomadic herders. These include
Somali, Afar, Gambella, and Ben Shangul Gumuz provinces.
The truth is, there is no congruence between “national self-determination” and
democratic and accountable government. The art of politics lies in maintaining levels of
integration and cooperation as high as could be made compatible with the consent of the
governed, and in reaching agreement on the optimal locus of decisions in making for
particular areas of policy.
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ETHIOPIA’S PROVINCES 1952 – 1980
The frightening experiment has failed because of the following reasons:
First, the very boundaries that were supposed to solve “ethnic problems” are in dispute
everywhere .The Amharas, Tigreans, Gurages, Somalis, Sidama and the Southern
People’s for instance, do not accept “Oramia”, or the land claimed by the Oromo
Liberation Front. In so far as the Oromos have the right to live anywhere in Ethiopia, the
right of other Ethiopians to live even in provinces where the Oromos constitute a
majority will have to be recognized and accepted as a matter of principle. Otherwise, the
situation could go out of hand. In the same way, the people of Gondar and Wollo, whose
territories have been illegally and forcefully annexed and incorporated to Tigrai, have
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refused to recognize the present boundaries of Tigrai. Tigreans as well as all other
Ethiopians can still go and work on the farms as they used to. Hence, those districts will
have to revert back to Wollo and Gondar. Secondly, the act of sharing regional
boundaries based on the main ethnic groups has created minority ethnic groups in each
region, which are being condemned to the status of permanent minorities without any
hope of being able to obtain political power. There are 23 ethnic groups in six of the
regional states that do not have a sufficient population to qualify for constituency seats.
Third, though legally sanctioned, ethnic parties have not been willing to work together.
They tend to be arrogant and neglect the welfare of the minorities whose political
support they do not need and advocate only the concerns of their constituencies,
regardless of the consequences upon the national interest. A good example would be the
refusal of the Oramia regional government to accept the application of the All Amhara
Peoples’s Organization to open branch offices in the region. Fourth, such a system will
always be unstable because political parties will have to be organized along ethnic lines.
Moreover, for a federal system to work effectively, the constituent state provinces
should be of equal size. What sort of equality is there between Oromia and the Afar, or
between Ben Shangul and the Amhara state?
Fifth, reliance on ethnicity as the boundary of political parties has proved to be a disaster
as an electoral struggle elsewhere. In fact, without an opposition which both aggregates
societal interests and represents them in elections, the country cannot move from a
political opening to a viable form of multi-party democracy.114
There is also the question of resources. Time and space does not permit a detailed
examination of this subject. But to illustrate the point, let us look at some of the regions.
For reasons given earlier, the Oromos inhabit that part of the country, which is rich and
fertile. It produces much of Ethiopia’s industrial raw materials, livestock products,
timber, cash crops such as tea and coffee, and minerals that include gold and platinum.
Similarly, the Afars inhabit an area that is rich in geo-thermal energy, which is a cheap
source of electricity. It also has an estimated 200 million tons of potash. Because of the
construction of a series of muti-purpose dams on the Awash River in the 1960s, the area
now produces cotton, sugar cane, tobacco, and various fruits and vegetables. In the same
way, the Ogaden has proven natural gas and oil deposits. And if a series of multipurpose dams were to be built on the Wabi Shibele and Juba Rivers, the area would
produce a variety of cash crops and industrial raw materials. Southern Ethiopia too, is
richly endowed. But the present boundary set-up puts the Amharas, the second largest
population in the country, at a disadvantage. Thousands of them have been killed in the
last ten years in other regions where they lived for centuries because of the hostile policy
initiated against them by the existing regime. Thousands of them have also been
uprooted from their lands for precisely the same reason. The area they inhabit, which the
regime calls the “Amhara Region”, has been farmed for centuries without interruption.
Since it is overpopulated, the land: man ratio is not favourable. In so far as current
information goes, it does not also seem to be blessed with known mineral deposits that
are commercially exploitable. Even the few commercial farms, which existed in the
Amhara Provinces like Gondar and Wollo have been forcefully annexed and
incorporated to Tigrai. If the peace and stability of the country is not to be disturbed,
these facts should be seriously taken into consideration.
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To go back to the early point of discussion, in a country like the USA, national unity has
been attained among people of the most disparate origins, and that differences of
religion, of culture, and of tradition have not been insurmountable obstacles to the
coming together of people. While the authorities in the USA talk of “The American
People”, and of “One Nation, Indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all”, the
authorities in Addis Ababa and leaders of ethnic parties who have their own sinister
political agendas insist on “The Peoples of Ethiopia”. Yet, the people of Ethiopia are
more similar and historically more connected than the different people that inhabit the
USA. Since Ethiopians have been interacting with one another for centuries, their
national identification has been largely formed, and they enjoy widely shared values and
internalize restrains on highly parochial and norm-challenging actions.
Towards a Working Federation
A federation can be defined as a political unit on which a number of smaller political
units develop certain power over themselves and their citizens to which they entrust the
conduct of such affairs as national defense, foreign affairs, foreign trade, economic
development, transport and communications, public health, and education. Individual
provinces retain some control over their internal affairs, and in order that their rights
should be clearly defined, there is usually a federal constitution, which allocates powers
between them and the federal government. The gradual transfer of administrative duties
to the centre provides for centralization, whereas the sharing of these duties between the
centre and the periphery maintains the guarantee of survival.115 As disputes often arise
as to the constitutional legality of executive decisions or laws made by the federal
government, a supreme court is generally created to interpret the constitution.
Among the elements that contribute to the smooth functioning of such a system are that
the constituent parts in a federal system must be fairly equal in population and wealth, or
else balanced geographically or numerically in their inequabilities. The lack of balance
among the constituent parts has often resulted in the failure of the federal system.
Successful federal systems have also been characterized by the permanence of their
internal boundaries. Boundary changes may occur, but such changes are made only with
the consent of the polities involved and are avoided except in extreme situations. 116
In the case of Ethiopia, one is recommending the federal system for the following
reasons:
First, the system can be used as a means of uniting further the people who
are already linked by bonds of history, culture, and nationality through the
redistribution of political power among the constituent provinces. In this
case, the provinces that constitute the federal system are unalterably parts
of the national whole. Federalism invariably leads to the development of a
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strong national government operating in direct contact with the people it
serves.117
Second, it allows for local initiative.
Third, federalism is being recommended as a form of decentralized
government in an established state as a repository of all powers not
especially granted in order to speed-up the development of the provinces.
This includes the possession of substantial powers, which can be enforced
even against the principal local units, which will not be free to nullify the
laws of the central government or to withdraw from the federal unit.
Fourth, within the framework of centralization of the state, there has
always been a more loosely federated Ethiopian state. In fact, as noted by
a keen observer, Ethiopia’s geography predisposed it towards regionalism.
Yet, thanks to the manner in which the rulers expanded their authority,
including the spread of their language and religion, Ethiopia has evolved
into a large unified polity. 118 Hence, the need for partial indulgence into
decentralization and using it to build consent for centralization, as has
been the essence of nation building in many states.
Fifth, given its geographic location, its historical, cultural, and economic
links with the countries of the Horn of Africa, and its potential resource
endowments, Ethiopia can play an important role in the peace and
development of the sub-region. Phase I should focus on the establishment
of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia. An open-ended and a working
federal structure should make it possible for Eritrea to join the federation.
Phase II involves Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia. One would suggest
cooperation with these countries on a number of socio-economic projects
that could lay down the foundations that would lead to a confederation and
eventually to the establishment of the Federation of Northeast African
States. Such projects would include the construction of muti-purpose dams
on the Awash, the Juba, and the Wabi Shibelle rivers, and cooperation in
the exploitation of the oil and natural gas deposits in Eastern Ethiopia. To
that end, the necessary roads and infrastructure could be built to encourage
trade between these countries. Ethiopia can, for instance, export hydroelectricity to all of its neighbours. It could also conduct 10% of its export import trade through Port Sudan; 5% through Massawa; 35% through
Assab; 30% through Djibouti; 10% through Berbera; and 10% through
Mogadisho.
Most of the Ethiopian opposition movements seem to favour political pluralism. But the
proof of the pudding as they say is in the eating. Federalism can exist only when there is
considerable tolerance of diversity and willingness to take political action through
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conciliation. Tolerance, fair play, and respecting the equality of rights of other people,
including their views, are the abiding principles of true federalists.
Given the above factors, the dismantling of the anachronistic ethnic federal structure and
its replacement by a workable federal structure appears to be important. The local
potentates and entrenched ethnic oligarchs will resist, but to no avail. The federal idea
can be implemented by restructuring the state along internal regional administrative
boundaries that have evolved historically and have received legitimacy by the passage of
time. The old provinces of Arussie, Bale, Gojjam, Gomu Goffa, Gondar, Harar,
Illubabor, Keffa, Shoa, Sidamo, Tigrai, Wollega and Wollo have strong historical
legitimacy. Furthermore, given some modification, the existing Afar and Somali regions,
could be retained as provinces. In this case, the members of the federation will be fifteen
provinces.
In point of fact, the provincial boundaries were not created in an arbitrary manner. They
were conceived in such a way in order to create what the Germans call “lebensraum” -living space. In most cases, rivers like the Mereb, the Tekezie, the Abai, Awash, and so
on, served as natural boundaries. Moreover, the highlands and the lowlands, which
complement each other, were brought together in a common provincial market. One
could look at the boundaries of such provinces as Wollo, Gondar, Shoa, Bale,Gojjam,
Wollega, or even Harar. Such an integrated common provincial market in turn created
conditions where highland and lowland products are exchanged. They also served to
integrate cultures. So why dismantle the boundaries which provide economic links, and
which have strong historical legitimacy, and with which millions of Ethiopians identify?
A federal system by definition is costly. But for a vast country like Ethiopia, it is the best
system. Some of the provinces will need subsidy from the federal government for a
while. Given political stability, which will provide the opportunity to exploit Ethiopia’s
immense resources, it will pay in the long run. A federal constitution which corresponds
to Ethiopia’s historical experiences, but modified to suit its present conditions, and
based on such principles as the rule of law, state secularism, a bill of rights, a system of
checks and balances, political and economic pluralism, including the legalization of
political parties that are organized on the basis of shared political principles and
philosophies and not merely on ethnic identities, should therefore be presented to the
Ethiopian people. A two-chamber federal parliament consisting of a Senate and a
Chamber of Deputies could be envisioned. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies could
take place every four years, and for the Senate every six years. Political parties that have
concrete political programmes to help promote the peace, security and prosperity of the
people should be given free access into the state-owned mass media to reach the masses.
Such parties could be conservatives, liberals, socialists, social democrats, Marxists, and
so on. The point is the playing field would have to be leveled. They should be
encouraged to compete in the market place of ideas, and to struggle for the hearts and
minds of the Ethiopian people. The leading party, which commands the highest vote,
could select the head of state as well as head of government.
As we have seen, the present political system in Ethiopia is creating political instability
and ethnic strife, which, unless timely measures are taken, could lead to the eventual
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dismemberment of the country. Without peace and stability, economic development will
be an impossible task. The people of Ethiopia will be mired in poverty for generations to
come. The alternative approach to national development that is provided in this study
will ensure political stability. It will reduce ethnic strife and enhance national unity, as
well as inflows of foreign capital investment. The result will be a peaceful, unified, free,
and democratic Ethiopia that will be in a much better position to conquer poverty and
technical backwardness, and which could also shoulder some regional responsibility for
peace and development.
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